





debts. In so doing, bankruptcy provides a form of insurance to house-
holds. In particular, bankruptcy allows households some ﬂexibility in
timing repayments in a way that allows for sudden unforeseen contingencies.
As an implicit form of insurance, bankruptcy may augment, substitute for, or
even limit other forms of insurance. Conversely, the presence of other forms
of insurance against life’s vicissitudes may enhance or limit the usefulness of
bankruptcy. In this article, I investigate the interaction between one of the
largest social insurance schemes, the U.S. unemployment insurance system
(UI), and the personal bankruptcy system.
An overwhelmingly large proportion of those ﬁling for bankruptcy (over
two-thirds) have recently experienced a job disruption (Sullivan et al. [2000]
and Domowitz and Sartain [1999]). Further, Cochrane (1991) ﬁnds that pro-
longedspellsofunemploymentarepoorlyinsuredandthereforeresultinlarge
drops in consumption levels. How does the level of unemployment insurance
available to workers affect the beneﬁts of bankruptcy protection? Conversely,
how do the beneﬁts of bankruptcy alter the beneﬁts generated by UI? Lastly,
how does the presence of bankruptcy alter the consequences of scaling back
unemployment insurance?
Myﬁndingsareasfollows: First, inthebenchmarkeconomy, introducing
bankruptcy under even low UI replacement ratios lowers welfare. Second,
reducing the UI replacement ratio increases bankruptcy rates.1 Additionally,
The author would like to thank Tom Humphrey, Ned Prescott, John Weinberg, Roy Webb, and
seminar participants at Colgate University and Hamilton College. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 One reason why this should not be seen as obvious is that penalties for bankruptcy involve
ejection from credit markets. Therefore, lowering the replacement ratio hurts bankruptcy ﬁlers more
than before, which may imply fewer, not greater, annual ﬁlings.
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reducing the UI replacement ratio worsens consumption smoothing less when
bankruptcyisallowedthanwhenitisnot. However,whilewelfarefallsslightly
with the replacement ratio, the fall is nearly independent of bankruptcy law.
Third, bankruptcylowersassettrade, whichinturnimpliesamoreequallong-
run distribution of wealth (as fewer households hold either very low or very
high asset levels to deal with income shocks). However, asset trading behav-
ior is not affected greatly by changes in the UI replacement ratio. Fourth,
UI is more important than bankruptcy: if society must choose either UI or
bankruptcy, it should choose UI. Last, bankruptcy’s role in providing insur-
anceisclearlydependentontheexistingsocialsafetynet. Insummary, unem-
ployment insurance appears to materially affect the desirability of bankruptcy
protection,butallowingbankruptcydoesnot,inthebenchmarkeconomy,alter
the consequences of scaling back UI.
TheenvironmenthereisanextensionoftheenvironmentstudiedinAthreya
(2002b),augmentedtoincludeunemployment. Athreya(2002b)examinesthe
welfare implications of recent “means-testing” proposals. The present work
is perhaps closest to the work of Livshits et al. (2002) and Fisher (2002). The
work of Fisher (2002) is the ﬁrst empirical study of the effects of public in-
surance on the personal bankruptcy decision. With respect to bankruptcy, this
work is also related to recent research of Chatterjee et al. (2001) and Li and
Sarte (2002). With respect to positive analyses of unemployment insurance
and its consequences, the work is related to, but simpler than, the models of
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) andAlvarez andVeracierto (2001). The two
preceding articles study unemployment insurance in general and the effect of
severance payments on job security, respectively.
Thesuddenfallinearningsassociatedwithalayofforﬁringoraninability
to continue working due to illness has long been cited by bankruptcy scholars
as an important correlate of bankruptcy.2 Thus, it stands to reason that the
treatment received by those who become separated from their employers will
inﬂuence their decision whether or not to ﬁle for bankruptcy. I turn now to
a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of consumption and savings in
the presence of some uninsurable income risks, including the risk of losing
one’s job. To simplify matters, I abstract from production decisions as well
as the impact of moral hazard in increasing the costs of administering an
unemployment insurance system. In ongoing research (Athreya [2002a]), I
pursue a more complete analysis to incorporate moral hazard and production.
1. THE MODEL
Bankruptcy allows a borrower to essentially design a state-contingent repay-
ment plan, whereby repayment is made only when outcomes for the borrower
2 Of course, this is no more causal than is having too little income or too much debt, given
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are relatively good. In this sense, the amount of a household’s income dedi-
catedtoloanrepaymentcanbevaried, allowingittoapplylimitedincomeina
difﬁcultperiodtowardsconsumptionratherthandebtservice. Unemployment
insurance and antipoverty programs, conversely, act directly on the income of
the household and help it remain above a threshold. Both of these programs
can help households insure themselves within a period against uncertain job
or health prospects. However, both programs must be paid for.
Allowing bankruptcy implies paying more for loans, as households are
also purchasing the right to suspend or completely avoid repayment, subject
to penalties. The high rate on loans also means that as households attempt
to avoid borrowing, each saves so much that the return to savings may fall
relative to an economy without bankruptcy. In turn, this fall mutes the ef-
fectiveness of savings to carry consumption across periods. Unemployment
insurance, for its part, must be paid for via (possibly distortionary) taxes. Fur-
thermore, as is well known, UI may introduce inefﬁciency, as both the effort
expended by currently employed households and the job search efforts of cur-
rently unemployed households may fall. Moreover, a major penalty for ﬁling
for bankruptcy is exclusion from credit markets. In contrast, while UI may
directly lower the need for borrowing and subsequent bankruptcy, generous
UI makes exclusion from credit markets less painful. Thus, while bankruptcy
and UI act in different ways, the presence of each is likely to affect the other.
Preferences and Endowments








where E0 is the expectations operator, conditional on time 0 information,
β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, c is consumption, and α is the measure of
both risk aversion and the desire for intertemporal consumption smoothing.
A full description of the household’s optimization problem will be given after
more notation is introduced.
Consumers in this market, intended to represent U.S. households, are
assumed to be risk-averse price takers. They face uncertain labor incomes
and other uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. The economy is composed of many
long-livedhouseholds. Atthebeginningofeachperiod,allhouseholdsreceive
a random level of labor income that depends on their employment status.
Householdsintheeconomyretainemploymentineachperiodwithprobability
ρ and are subject to the risk of losing employment in a given period with
probability (1 − ρ). Once employment is lost, regaining employment occurs
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in only the ﬁrst period of unemployment, that is, when the worker is newly
unemployed. In subsequent periods, there is a subsistence level of income
given to households. The endowment structure for unemployed households
is meant to reﬂect the current practice of the use of a ﬂat “replacement ratio”
and the limited length of UI beneﬁts in the United States. Newly unemployed
households receive θY, where Y is mean labor income and θ ∈ [θ,1] the
replacement ratio. After the ﬁrst period of unemployment, households, if
unemployed, will receive the subsistence transfer of Ymin > 0.3
Giventheexogenouslyimposedﬂowofhouseholdsoutofunemployment,
the replacement ratio for UI beneﬁts θ, and the long-run average employment
rate µe, it is easily shown that the per-period lump-sum tax ηu necessary to
ﬁnance the UI system is given by (1 − ρ)µeθY.4
Theendowmentsofemployedhouseholdsarerandomandcross-sectionally
independent but are serially dependent. Agents are identical ex ante in terms
of expected income, assets, and consumption. When employed, the after-tax
endowmentofahouseholdinperiodt cantaketwovalues,  Y = yl and Y = yh,
where the subscripts h and l denote high and low labor income, respectively,
such that yl <y h.5 Deﬁning unemployment as a separate state for the endow-
ment process is what allows for an analysis of how UI beneﬁts interact with
bankruptcy law.
There is a transition function over the income of employed households
whereby P(y  = yl|y = yl) = pll and P(y  = yh|y = yh) = phh. That is, pll
is the probability that the labor income shock remains low in the next period,
given that it is low in the current period. Similarly, phh is the probability that
the labor income shock remains high in the next period, given that it is high in
the current period. The assumption of serially dependent income introduces
anticipation effects in asset holdings and default behavior and determines the
effectiveness of using assets to smooth consumption. The parameters of the
income process will be chosen to be broadly consistent with post-transfer
income variability in U.S. data.
3 To focus on the interaction of bankruptcy and explicitly ﬁnanced unemployment insurance,
I avoid tracking the collection of taxes with which subsistence income payments are made. When
analyzing changes in bankruptcy law, Ymin will remain ﬁxed, so there is no harm in treating it
as an endowment.
To keep matters simple, I did not specify UI replacement to depend on previous income.
Doing so would entail tracking households ﬂowing into employment separately, which increases
the cost of computing solutions. Moreover, as job loss is exogenous with respect to income, the
average household ﬂowing into unemployment will have Y as the previous period’s labor income.
4 This is a simple example of a “bathtub” model of unemployment, whereby the exogenous
ﬂows into and out of employment are set such that there is a constant level of employed (and
unemployed) households in the economy. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). The ﬂow into un-
employment is given by (1−ρ)µe, and the cost of insurance payments to each household is θY.
Therefore, per capita taxes, ηu, must satisfy ηu = (1 − ρ)µeθY.
5 I deﬁne endowments as “after-tax” income for simplicity of notation and exposition.K.Athreya: Unemployment Insurance and Personal Bankruptcy 37
Assets
Agents may save using risk-free private bonds or risk-free government debt
and may borrow on an unsecured credit market. Government debt is incorpo-
rated both for descriptive accuracy as well as to avoid artiﬁcially constraining
households to the use of private borrowing and lending alone.6 Household
borrowing is subject to a liquidity constraint, and households may default
on previously acquired debt. The stock of private risk-free debt is issued by
diversiﬁed competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries in order to ﬁnance loans to
households. The market for privately issued unsecured credit in the United
Statesischaracterizedbyalarge, competitivemarketplacewhereprice-taking
lenders issue credit through the purchase of securities backed by repayments
from borrowers. These transactions are intermediated principally by credit
card issuers. As the typical credit card contract is described by a ﬁxed inter-
est rate and credit line, the interest rates charged by credit card issuers may
be viewed as being set to cover the aggregate default rate rather than being
individually tailored for each account. Further, interest rates do not appear
to vary systematically with individual debt levels, even though the marginal
likelihood of default may change.7
There will be two prices quoted for assets: a loan rate, rl, for those
who borrow and a deposit rate, rd, for those who save. These two rates are
different, becausewiththebankruptcyoption, acertainfractionofhouseholds
willdefaultinequilibrium,andinordertobreakeven,ﬁnancialintermediaries
will have to charge higher interest rates on loans than they pay for deposits.
The stock of government debt is denoted D and is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax
ηD = rdD on all households, where rd is the interest rate on risk-free savings
deposits.
The assumption that all debt is unsecured is less restrictive than it may
seem. The model best represents the section of U.S. households with little or
no collateral and higher than average labor income risk that rely on unsecured
debt to smooth consumption. Therefore, the welfare implications developed
here apply directly to a population most affected by bankruptcy reform. Ad-
ditionally, Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) argue that in many cases those
considering ﬁling use unsecured credit to pay off secured debts and then dis-
charge this debt in bankruptcy, thereby making the distinction between these
types of debt less clear in practice.
6 The stock of government debt per capita will, however, be held ﬁxed throughout all the
policy experiments I conduct.
7 On the existence of competitive equilibrium in a model where interest rates on loans cover
average repayment rates, see Dubey et al. (2000).38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy in the model will most closely resemble Chapter 7 “total liquida-
tion” bankruptcy. If a household ﬁles for bankruptcy, its income and assets
become known to the credit market, and if it qualiﬁes, its unsecured debt
is discharged but is then constrained for an uncertain period of time from
borrowing. Households may, however, save during this time. The principal
motivationforarandomperiodofrestrictedcreditaccessisthatitreducessig-
niﬁcantly the computational burden of solving the household’s optimization
problem. Speciﬁcally, the assumption allows one not to distinguish between
households on the basis of the length of their credit market exile.8 In each
period following a bankruptcy, a borrowing-constrained household remains
constrained with probability (1 − ψ). Therefore, the average time that a
household is constrained from borrowing and prohibited from ﬁling again is
g i v e nb y1 /(1 − ψ).
The Cost of Bankruptcy and Deadweight Loss
Bankruptcyinvolvesthreetypesofcosts. First,aswasjustdiscussed,itresults
in at least some exclusion from credit markets. Second, there are explicit time
costs arising from court dates and other legal proceedings. Finally, societal
disapproval or “stigma” may play a role (see Dubey et al. [2000]; Fay et al.
[1996]; and Gross and Souleles [2000]).
An important drawback of using bankruptcy to provide insurance is that
the penalties listed above typically do not involve a transfer of wealth from
debtors to anyone, let alone creditors. I denote by λ all costs of bankruptcy
beyond credit market exclusion. That is, λ represents the “deadweight” costs
of bankruptcy. I will set λ to match observed bankruptcy ﬁling rates among
homeowners, given the current average length of credit market exclusion.
The Household’s Problem
At any point in time, households belong to one of two mutually exclusive
classes of credit market status and three mutually exclusive classes with re-
spect to employment status. For credit status, households are either solvent or
constrained from borrowing. Solvent households are those that have full ac-
cesstocreditmarketsandhavetheoptionofﬁlingforbankruptcy. Borrowing-
constrained households are those that have ﬁled for bankruptcy in the past but
have not yet been readmitted to credit markets.9 With respect to employment
8 For more on stochastic punishment spells in bankruptcy, see Athreya (2002b) and Chatterjee
et al. (2001).
9 Therefore, while the move from solvent to borrowing-constrained status is a choice for
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status, households are either employed, newly unemployed, or unemployed
for more than one period.
Ineachperiod, giventheircurrentincomeandbeginning-of-periodassets,
households must choose consumption, c, and asset holdings to carry forward
intothenextperiod,denoteda . Fromtheindividual’spointofview,allsaving
is risk-free and earns the same rate of return. Therefore, the household makes
nodistinctionbetweengovernmentdebtandprivatebondswhenchoosinghow
to allocate its savings. Depending on whether it chooses to be a net borrower
or lender, it faces either the net rate of interest on loans, rl, or deposits, rd,
where rl >r d.
I restrict borrowing according to a household’s credit status as follows.
For solvent households, assets a  must be greater than aS, a negative number
indicating that solvent households may borrow. Households that have ﬁled
for bankruptcy face a more severe restriction than solvent households in their
ability to borrow. Their borrowing limit, denoted aB, therefore is given by
a  ≥ aB, where aB >a S. Similarly, households that are constrained from
borrowing are also restricted in their borrowing, with a limit denoted aBC,
whereby a  ≥ aBC, where aBC >a S.
When a household is solvent, it must ﬁrst choose whether or not to ﬁle.
It then chooses assets subject to the constraints for solvent or borrowing-
constrained households, depending on its employment status and default de-
cision. The current period state vector, conditional on credit status, is denoted
(e,a,y), indicating employment status, asset holdings, and current income,
respectively.
Current labor income is denoted y(e), where e denotes beginning-of-
period labor market status. A worker’s employment status belongs to one of
threecategories,thatis,e ∈{ e0,e 1,e 2},wheree0 denotesanemployedworker,
e1 a newly unemployed worker, and e2 a worker who has been unemployed
for more than one period. The law of motion for labor income is simple. In
anyperiod, anemployedworkermaylosehisjobwithprobability(1−ρ).H e
is then classiﬁed as “newly unemployed” and is eligible for UI beneﬁts. In the
following period, he ﬁnds employment with probability ξ, in which case he
receives a (random) endowment of y(e0).10 If he fails to ﬁnd employment in
thisperiod,heisclassiﬁedas“unemployed”andisthereforenolongereligible
for UI beneﬁts and receives labor income Ymin > 0.
I denote the value of being solvent by V S, the value of not ﬁling for
bankruptcy as WS, the value of ﬁling for bankruptcy as WB, and the value
of being borrowing-constrained as V BC. The value of solvency is given as
follows:
10 This income is drawn from the conditional probability distribution of income, as if the
household had received income shocks while unemployed. This simpliﬁes the analysis by avoiding
the use of a separate income process once released from unemployment.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
V S(e,a,y)= max[WS(e,a,y),WB(e,a,y)], (2)
where




1 + rd,l ≤ y(e)+ a (4)
s.t.
a  ≥ aS. (5)
Whenthehouseholdchoosestoﬁleforbankruptcy,ithasitsdebtremoved,
paysthenonpecuniarycost,λ,andthenisautomaticallysenttotheborrowing-
constrained state, where it obtains value V BC. Therefore, the value of ﬁling
for bankruptcy, WB, satisﬁes




1 + rd ≤ y(e) (7)
s.t.
a  ≥ aB. (8)
To deﬁne V BC above, note that households in the borrowing-constrained
state face a lottery, whereby with probability ψ, they are returned to solvency
(i.e., they are free to borrow and default in the following period), and with
probability (1 − ψ), they are still restricted from borrowing or defaulting.
Thus, we have





1 + rd ≤ y(e)+ a (10)
s.t.
a  ≥ aBC. (11)
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Equilibrium
The consumer choice problem above captures the decisions of a very large
number of households. However, given the absence of perfect income insur-
ance, householdsthathavereceivedmanybadincomeshocksarelikelytoﬁnd
themselves in debt, while those that have been lucky may have large levels of
savings. Theirchoicesaregovernedbyadecisionrule,which,forahousehold
of type i, speciﬁes asset holdings as a function of interest rates, employment
status, income, current assets, and borrowing constraints.
An equilibrium consists of a decision rule for each type of agent and
interest rates rl and rd such that four requirements are met. First, given
these interest rates, decision rules solve the optimization problem described
above for each type of household. Second, total economy-wide borrowing
by households equals total economy-wide saving. Third, the spread between
loan and deposit rates is such that ﬁnancial intermediaries exactly cover their
costs, given the observed bankruptcy rate. Fourth, the payments to newly
unemployed households each period must be covered by tax revenues (i.e.,
thegovernmentrunsabalancedbudgetwhilemaintainingthestockofdebtD).
In addition, I restrict attention to steady state equilibria where the bankruptcy
rate and the proportion of agents in the population with a given level of assets
are stationary, that is, the same at every date.
Welfare Measurement
The welfare criterion used here measures the percentage change in consump-
tion, in all states and at all dates, that would make a household indifferent be-
tween living in an economy in which a given policy experiment prevailed and
one in which the benchmark setting prevailed. Let this increment/decrement
to consumption be denoted by φ. A negative value for φ implies that house-
holds are worse off, and a positive value implies the reverse. Multiplying φ
by mean household income then converts φ into a dollar measure of annual
welfare gains or losses per household.11
11 With the utility function used here, the welfare measure is given as follows. The desir-





where V(x) is the maximal attainable utility from being in a given state x and µ is the long-run
stationary distribution (C.D.F.) of households across states. Therefore,   is the expected value
function of households over assets, income, and credit status. This is a utilitarian social welfare
function that weights all households equally. It measures ex ante welfare. I use this measure to
estimate the increment/decrement to consumption under a given bankruptcy policy, at all dates and
states, that makes households indifferent between the economy deﬁned by the proposed bankruptcy
policy and the benchmark economy. I denote this increment/decrement φ. Let  bench denote
benchmark welfare, and  policy denote welfare under a proposed policy. Given the preferences
used here, φ will satisfy the following:42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Beyond this measure of welfare, I will also examine the behavior of some
other statistics in assessing the interaction between bankruptcy and UI. Given
that changes in the replacement ratio alter the mean level of after-tax income
for households in the model, it is useful to have a measure of consumption
volatility that does not depend on average income, such as the coefﬁcient of
variation (denoted c.v.). The c.v. will also be useful when exploring the role
of bankruptcy in altering the level of asset accumulation and decumulation.
Tomeasureinequality,Iuseatraditionaltool,theGiniCoefﬁcient. Roughly
speaking, this coefﬁcient measures the departure of a given distribution of
wealth, consumption, or income from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini
of one indicates, for example, that the very richest household holds the en-
tirety of wealth, while a coefﬁcient of zero indicates that all households hold
exactly equal levels of wealth. A more disaggregated measure of inequality
is the distribution of income, consumption, and wealth by various percentiles,
which I also report below.
Parameterization
The model parameters are set to match observed bankruptcy rates under plau-
sible levels of income shock persistence and volatility and are summarized in
Table 1. For brevity, rather than including a full discussion here, I refer the
interested reader to the details inAthreya (2002a, b).
With respect to unemployment insurance, I follow Hopenhayn and Nicol-
ini(1997),whousetheestimatesofMeyer(1990). Inparticular,Meyer(1990)
ﬁnds that the average length of insured unemployment is thirteen weeks, with
a replacement rate of 66 percent and a 10 percent chance of reemployment
at the end of the spell. I therefore set the model period at thirteen weeks, set
θ = 0.66, andsetξ = 0.10. Thecreditlimitissetbynotingthatmedianunse-
cured debt among bankrupt households in recent years has ﬂuctuated between
one-fourth and one-half of annual median income (see Sullivan et al. [2000,
65–66, 122]). Credit card debt, to which the debt in the model corresponds
most closely, was approximately $9,500 in 1997, equal to U.S. median quar-
terly income (Sullivan et al. [2000]). Given the period of thirteen weeks, or
one quarter, I therefore set as = Y. For simplicity, I set aB and aBC to zero.
An important parameter in the model with respect to bankruptcy is the
one governing credit market exclusion, ψ. While ψ is not easily observable,
lendersintheunsecuredcreditmarketstillallowagentsaccesstoloanmarkets
φ =
 policy + 1
(1−α)(1−β)






Under this criterion, φ>0 implies that households are better off under a proposed policy than in
the benchmark case, and φ<0 implies the reverse.K.Athreya: Unemployment Insurance and Personal Bankruptcy 43
Table 1 Parameters
Parameter Value Source
β (annual) 0.914 Calibrated
α 2.00 Aiyagari (1994)
pi
hh 0.74 Heaton and Lucas (1997)
pi
ll 0.74 Heaton and Lucas (1997)
ρ 0.006 Calibrated
µe 0.943 Alvarez and Veracierto (2001)
ξ 0.10 Meyer (1990)
θ (benchmark) 0.66 Meyer (1990)
yh 1.25 Heaton and Lucas (1997)
yl 0.75 Heaton and Lucas (1997)
Ymin 0.40, 0.10
λ 2.80 Calibrated
as −Y Huggett (1993); Sullivan et al. (2000)
aB,aBC 0
following default or bankruptcy within a year or two. I set ψ = 0.25 such
that the average period of exile from credit markets is four model periods, or
one year.12 The level of income received by unemployed households after
unemployment beneﬁts are exhausted, Ymin, is set in the benchmark case to
0.40, to provide 40 percent of median household income, as a proxy for the
various income support and transfer programs available to U.S. households.
This level amounts to $1,332 per household per month.13 Subsequently, Ymin
willbesettoamuchlower0.10, or$333perhouseholdpermonth, toexamine
the role played by social insurance beyond unemployment compensation.
Theparameterλ,whichisthecostofbankruptcyinexcessofcreditmarket
restrictions, will be inferred by the level that it must take in order to match ob-
served bankruptcy ﬁling rates. In terms of bankruptcy rates, total nonbusiness
bankruptcy ﬁlings have been stable at roughly 1.3 million annually. Of these,
roughly 70 percent are Chapter 7, “total liquidation” bankruptcies, implying
an annual incidence of 0.9 percent.
2. RESULTS
To begin, I deﬁne the benchmark case, against which policy experiments will
be compared.
12 In this model, exclusion from borrowing hurts the households without helping anyone else.
It is therefore a deadweight penalty and could have been left unmodeled by combining it with
the general nonpecuniary penalty, λ.
13 The transfers received by households beyond UI come from the major public assistance
programs in the United States: Supplemental Security Income (SSI), General Assistance, Medicaid,
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Welfare Effects of Introducing Bankruptcy
θr l rd Bankruptcy Welfare Utility
Rate Change ($)
0.66 4.39% 4.39% — — −37.43
0.66 13.00% 2.57% 0.90% −$66.88 −37.57
0.50 4.21% 4.21% — — −37.49
0.50 13.00% 2.35% 0.99% −$70.46 −37.63
0.40 4.06% 4.06% — — −37.52
0.40 12.55% 2.31% 1.03% −$62.70 −37.65
Deﬁnition 1 Throughout the analysis, the “benchmark” economy is deﬁned
speciﬁcallytobethecasewherebankruptcyisallowed, thereplacementratio,
θ, is set at 0.66, and Ymin = 0.40.
Iﬁrststudytheconsequences,whenYmin = 0.40,ofintroducingbankrupt-
cy into a setting where unemployment is already partially insured. The clear
conclusion in this case is that bankruptcy protection is harmful, as seen in
Table 2. Introducing bankruptcy is damaging even when the unemployment
insurance system is very strict. The quarterly cost to the household of in-
troducing bankruptcy ranges from $66.88, when θ = 0.66, to $70.46, when
θ = 0.50, to $62.70, when θ = 0.40. With respect to prices, I ﬁnd that when
bankruptcy is introduced, the interest rate on savings falls, while the rate on
borrowing rises. For example, when θ = 0.66, rd falls from 4.39 percent to
2.57 percent, while rl rises sharply from 4.39 percent to 13.00 percent. Such
changes in interest rates are associated with worsened consumption smooth-
ing, as the return to savings is low, while borrowing becomes very expensive.
On the other hand, the option of bankruptcy allows households new consump-
tion smoothing possibilities. On net, however, welfare appears to suffer. The
welfare measure reported in Table 2 captures the change in welfare generated
by the introduction of bankruptcy, holding the replacement ratio ﬁxed. This
result is summarized in Result 1.
Result 1 In the benchmark economy, introducing bankruptcy under even low
UI replacement ratios lowers welfare, increases interest rates on loans, and
reduces interest rates on savings.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, lower replacement ratios produce systematically
lower utility levels. For example, when bankruptcy is not allowed, the ex-
pected utility of households falls from −37.43 to −37.49 to −37.52 as θ
drops from 0.66 to 0.50 to 0.40 (see Table 2). The intuition here is simple. As
the replacement ratio falls, the income risk faced by households rises, leaving
more room for bankruptcy to be a useful form of implicit insurance.K.Athreya: Unemployment Insurance and Personal Bankruptcy 45
Table 3 Effects of Lower UI Replacement Ratios
Panel A: Welfare Effects of Lower UI Replacement,
without Bankruptcy
θr l rd Bankruptcy Welfare Welfare Change ($)
Rate Change ($) Rel. to Benchmark
0.66 4.39% 4.39% — — +$66.88
0.50 4.21% 4.21% — −$23.13 +$43.71
0.40 4.06% 4.06% — −$40.68 +$26.14
Panel B: Welfare Effects of Lower UI Replacement,
with Bankruptcy
θr l rd Bankruptcy Welfare
Rate Change ($)
0.66 13.00% 2.57% 0.90% —
0.50 13.00% 2.35% 0.99% −$26.82
0.40 12.55% 2.31% 1.03% −$36.60
Because bankruptcy causes less harm when the replacement ratio is low
than when it is high, it appears that bankruptcy does play an insurance role.
To see this, consider PanelA of Table 3 for the results when bankruptcy is not
allowed. Welfare (relative to the case where θ = 0.66, and bankruptcy is not
allowed) falls slightly with the replacement ratio, by the equivalent of $23.13
when θ falls from 0.66 to 0.50, and by $40.68 when θ falls from 0.66 to 0.40.
AsseeninPanelBofTable3,whenbankruptcyisallowed,thebankruptcy
rate rises systematically when θ falls from 0.66 to 0.40, from 0.90 percent in
the benchmark to 1.03 percent, an increase of 100,000 ﬁlings annually. This
effect is supported in recent empirical work of Fisher (2002), who ﬁnds that
higher UI beneﬁts are associated with lower bankruptcy rates.
When welfare is measured relative to the benchmark economy, as shown
inTable4, thewelfareeffectofeliminatingbankruptcy, whilealwayspositive,
becomes smaller as θ rises. The gain from eliminating bankruptcy, relative
to the benchmark, is $66.88 when θ = 0.66 but drops to $26.14 when θ falls
to 0.40. As noted earlier, all else equal, the effect of an increased interest
rate on borrowing and a lowered rate on savings deposits would be to worsen
consumptionsmoothing. Yetsuchinterestratechangesareactuallyassociated
with small improvements in consumption smoothing, as seen in the column
“c.v.-Cons.” PanelsA and B of Table 4 show that when θ = 0.66, the c.v. of
consumption falls slightly, from 0.1347 without bankruptcy to 0.1336 when
bankruptcyisallowed. Thissuggeststhatbankruptcymustbeprovidingsome
offsetting consumption beneﬁts. Nonetheless, the costs of implementing a
bankruptcy system, from both the socially wasteful penalty of credit market46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 4 Distributional Effects of Lower UI Replacement Ratios
Panel A: Distributional Effects of UI, without Bankruptcy
θ Gini-Cons. c.v.-Cons. c.v.-Assets Gini-Assets Avg. Borr.
(% of Y)
0.66 0.0663 0.1347 1.6878 0.9497 −17.21%
0.50 0.0667 0.1363 1.6809 0.9465 −17.17%
0.40 0.0671 0.1374 1.6829 0.9477 −17.12%
Panel B: Distributional Effects of UI, with Bankruptcy
θ Gini-Cons. c.v.-Cons. c.v.-Assets Gini-Assets Avg. Borr.
(% of Y)
0.66 0.0694 0.1336 1.4211 0.8027 −11.64%
0.50 0.0699 0.1349 1.4211 0.8029 −11.63%
0.40 0.0698 0.1352 1.4189 0.8014 −11.67%
exclusion against ﬁlers, as well as the nonpecuniary costs, cause overall wel-
fare to fall.
Interest rate spreads are relatively stable, but the deposit rate does fall
from 2.57 percent in the benchmark to 2.35 percent and 2.31 percent as θ falls
from 0.66 to 0.50 to 0.40, respectively (see Panel B of Table 3). The fall in
depositratesistheconsequenceofhouseholdsneedingtosavemoreintheface
of greater income loss from unemployment than before. As all households
attempt to save more, the interest rate on savings falls. Conversely, as the cost
of funds for banks falls, the increased bankruptcy rate does not result in an
increase in the level of the interest rate on loans, relative to the benchmark. In
terms of consumption smoothing, however, the presence of bankruptcy helps
in the face of reduced replacement ratios. In Panel A of Table 4, the c.v.
of consumption rises from 0.1347 to 0.1363 to 0.1374, with reductions in θ,
when bankruptcy is not allowed. When bankruptcy is allowed (see Panel B
of Table 4), the c.v. of consumption rises by less, from 0.1336 to 0.1349 to
0.1352. We therefore have the following:
Result 2 Reducing the UI replacement ratio lowers welfare slightly and in-
creasesbankruptcyrates. However,thefallinwelfareisnearlyindependentof
whether or not bankruptcy is allowed. Additionally, reducing the UI replace-
ment ratio worsens consumption smoothing less when bankruptcy is allowed.
By making repayment optional, bankruptcy has the potential to reduce
the need to actively accumulate and decumulate savings in the face of income
shocks. Furthermore, in an economy where bankruptcy is allowed, the inter-
est rate on loans might be prohibitively high, while that on savings very low,
therebyretardingtheabilityofhouseholdstosmoothconsumptionbyborrow-
ing and saving frequently. Indeed, for both reasons, bankruptcy appears toK.Athreya: Unemployment Insurance and Personal Bankruptcy 47
signiﬁcantly lower asset trade. In particular, whenever bankruptcy is allowed,
the volume and volatility of asset trade fall sharply, as seen in PanelsA and B
of Table 4. For example, compare the case when bankruptcy is allowed un-
der the benchmark replacement ratio (Panel B) to the case where bankruptcy
is eliminated under benchmark replacement ratios (Panel A). The coefﬁcient
of variation of assets jumps from 1.42 to 1.68 and the Gini Coefﬁcient for
assets similarly rises from 0.80 to 0.95. The average volume of borrowing,
denoted “Avg. Borr.,” also jumps from a roughly 11.6 percent debt-income
ratio (approximately $4,000 per household annually), which is close to the
8.5 percent level found in the data (CBO [2000]), to roughly 17 percent of
median annual income (or $7,000 per household).14 Note, however, that in
all cases, the response of asset trading to reductions in the replacement ratio
is very modest. Therefore, we have the following:




falls. This fall is in turn associated with a great deal more borrowing. For
equilibrium to obtain in the credit market, however, it must also be the case
thathouseholdssavemoreingoodtimes. Inturn,onemightexpecttheinterest
rate (recall that there is only one interest rate in the absence of bankruptcy)
to rise. Indeed, when bankruptcy is eliminated, the rate of interest on bank
deposits rises sharply from 2.57 percent under benchmark UI replacement
ratios to 4.39 percent when bankruptcy is eliminated.
Given that both unemployment insurance and bankruptcy protection pro-
vide some insurance, it is useful to ask the following: If households had to
chooseeitherone,butnotboth,whichwouldhouseholdsprefer? Table5shows
theresultsforfourpolarcases. Notsurprisingly,itisunemploymentinsurance
that is quantitatively much more important than bankruptcy. Welfare is lowest
whenbankruptcyisallowedandUIisdrivendowntoYmin bysettingθ = 0.40.
The latter generates a utility level of −37.65 units. When bankruptcy is al-
lowed but θ = 0.66 (the benchmark case), utility rises to −37.57 units. When
bankruptcy is not allowed and θ = 0.40, welfare climbs further to −37.52
units. Last, allowing UI alone, with θ = 0.66, produces the highest wel-
fare, −37.44 units. In dollar terms, the quarterly welfare consequences range
from −$36.60 when bankruptcy is allowed and θ = 0.40, to $66.88 when
bankruptcy is not allowed and θ = 0.66, to +$26.14 when bankruptcy is not
allowed and θ = 0.40. For exposition, let Welf(Bk ={ Yes,No},θ)de-
note the welfare under a regime where bankruptcy is either allowed (whereby
14 Speciﬁcally, this measures, conditional on borrowing, the mean level of unsecured debt
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Bk = Yes), ornot(Bk = No), andaUIreplacementratio, θ. Wecanexpress
the following rank ordering for welfare:
Result 4 Welf(No,θ = 0.66)>We l f( N o ,θ= 0.40)>We l f( Ye s ,θ=
0.66)[Benchmark] >W e l f ( Y e s , θ= 0.40). Therefore, if society must
choose either UI or bankruptcy, it should choose UI. Furthermore, even if
it could choose both UI and bankruptcy, a society should choose UI alone.
Also, as mentioned above, not allowing bankruptcy even when UI is very
strict (θ = 0.40) improves welfare relative to allowing bankruptcy when UI is
generous(θ = 0.66). Thisisthesenseinwhichbankruptcyisquitedamaging.
The intuition for this is that better UI coverage mutes the consequences of
exclusion from the credit market and makes bankruptcy more attractive. This
raises a more general issue.
Remark 1 Any program that smooths a household’s income lowers the need
for access to credit markets. Therefore, bankruptcy becomes most attractive
precisely when it is least necessary.
Thus far, I have held the subsistence level of income, Ymin, ﬁxed while
altering the replacement ratio and bankruptcy law. The subsistence level of
income is meant to represent the combined effects of all social insurance
programsbeyondunemploymentinsurance. Oneabstractionisthattheperiod
isthirteenweekslong, wheneligibilityforunemploymentbeneﬁtsistypically
at least twenty-six weeks. In the benchmark setting, Ymin could be thought
of as representing these extra beneﬁts in the remaining thirteen weeks (if one
qualiﬁes), after which other income support programs might take over. I now
brieﬂy note the effects of cutting UI off after one period, followed by only
minimal public assistance. To this end, I set public assistance to cover just
10 percent of median household income, whereby Ymin = 0.10. In this case,
the household that is no longer qualiﬁed for UI receives the equivalent of only
$333 monthly in public assistance.15 I will not discuss these results in detail,
butwillnotethefollowingﬁndings: First,bothsavingsandborrowinginterest
rates fall, as precautionary savings rise. Second, welfare rises as bankruptcy
is allowed. Third, welfare rises by increasing amounts as the replacement
ratio falls, consistent with an increased insurance role. Last, the reductions
in welfare emerging from reductions in the UI replacement ratio are smaller
whenbankruptcyisallowedthanwhenitisnot. Therefore, becausetheresults
for Ymin = 0.10 reverse those where Ymin = 0.40, we are led to the following
conclusion:
Result 5 Bankruptcy’sroleinprovidinginsuranceisclearlydependentonthe
existingsocialsafetynet. Forexample, whenYmin isloweredto0.10, allowing
bankruptcy improves welfare relative under all UI replacement ratios.
15Assuming a $40,000 median annual income.K.Athreya: Unemployment Insurance and Personal Bankruptcy 49
Table 5 Bankruptcy and UI: Four Polar Cases
Bkrptcy., rl rd Bkrptcy. c.v.- Gini- Welfare Utility
θ Rate Cons. Cons. Change
($)
Bench
[Yes, θ = 0.66] 13.00% 2.57% 0.90% 0.1336 0.0694 — −37.57
Yes, θ = 0.40 12.55% 2.31% 0.99% 0.1352 0.0698 −$36.60 −37.65
No, θ = 0.66 4.39% 4.39% — 0.1347 0.0663 +$66.88 −37.44





who ﬁnd, in a life-cycle setting, that the presence of large uninsured medical
shocks allows bankruptcy to play a role in improving welfare.
3. FINAL REMARKS
I have developed a stylized model of employment, unemployment, and bank-
ruptcy in order to better understand how the consumption “insurance” pro-
vided by bankruptcy interacts with that provided by explicit unemployment
insurance programs.
Five results are worth noting. First, in the benchmark economy, introduc-
ing bankruptcy under even low UI replacement ratios lowers welfare. Sec-
ond, reducing the UI replacement ratio lowers welfare slightly and increases
bankruptcyrates. Althoughthefallinwelfareisnearlyindependentofwhether
bankruptcy is allowed or not, reducing the UI replacement ratio worsens con-
sumption smoothing less when bankruptcy is allowed. Third, bankruptcy
lowers asset trade and makes the distribution of wealth more equal. However,
assettradingbehaviorisnotaffectedgreatlybychangesintheUIreplacement
ratio. Fourth, UI is more important than bankruptcy: If society must choose
either UI or bankruptcy, it should choose UI.
Last, bankruptcy’s role in providing insurance is clearly dependent on the
existing social safety net. In summary, unemployment insurance appears to
materially affect the desirability of bankruptcy protection. Were other social
assistance to be scaled sharply back, the results suggest that bankruptcy could
serve a useful insurance role in the United States. However, as currently
practiced, income risk, broadly deﬁned, does not appear high enough to jus-
tify bankruptcy in the presence of unemployment insurance. Indeed, when50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
unemployment insurance is set to current levels, bankruptcy actually appears
to harm the efﬁcacy of the UI system.
A potentially important abstraction in the model is the absence of moral
hazard that could limit the extent of socially desirable insurance protection.
Speciﬁcally, unemployedhouseholdsinthemodeldonotaltertheirjobsearch
efforts in the face of insurance payments but rather face an exogenous prob-
ability (ξ) of return to employment. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) ﬁnd
that when households are allowed to reject job offers while unemployed, but
are subject to random (or imperfect) auditing by the government, the welfare
maximizing level of insurance is much lower than otherwise. Furthermore,
effort expended by workers while employed may fall with the promise of gen-
erous unemployment insurance. Also, the availability of bankruptcy will help
reducetheincentiveeffectsofstrictunemploymentinsuranceandmayfurther
increasemoralhazard. Theexperienceratingofemployerslowersthewilling-
ness of ﬁrms to ﬁre lazy workers, leading again to the possibility of reduced
effort. Moral hazard in an economy where output is explicitly produced using
labor leads in turn to lower output, quite unlike the pure endowment setting
employed here. The model also places ﬁxed limits on credit availability that
dovarywithbankruptcylaw. Itispossiblethatastrictbankruptcycodewould
improve access to credit.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to suspect that the simple environment
developed here does provide a useful ﬁrst pass at the interactions between the
UI system and the personal bankruptcy system. In particular, the unemploy-
ment insurance in the model is strictly capped at one period, and the re-entry
probability of 0.10 by no means provides comfortable income prospects for
those who fail to ﬁnd work. With respect to the robustness of using ﬁxed
credit limits, note that the elimination of bankruptcy is treated here synony-
mously with the prohibition of default. To the extent that informal default
would become more prevalent were bankruptcy outlawed, the expansion of
credit availability might be limited. With that said, in ongoing work (Athreya
[2002a]), I augment the model developed here to include moral hazard in job
search effort, as well as capital accumulation and the production of output
where labor effort matters. This article is therefore a ﬁrst step in the analysis
of how the interactions between bankruptcy and an existing social insurance
program determine the desirability of changes to each one in isolation.
APPENDIX: DEFINING EQUILIBRIUM
Astochasticstationaryequilibriumisdeﬁnedasfollows: LetX = A× Y ×CS
denote the state space for households, where CS ={ S,BC}. Let χB be the
Borel σ-algebra on X. The household’s asset decision rule is denoted a(x).K.Athreya: Unemployment Insurance and Personal Bankruptcy 51
The decision rule and the uncertainty of income together imply a stochastic
process for consumption and asset holdings, with an associated transition
functionQ(x,Z),∀Z ∈ χB onthemeasurablespace(X,χB). Thistransition
function implies a stationary probability measure µ(Z) for all Z ∈ χB. This
isameasureonsubsetsofX thatdescribesthejointdistributionofhouseholds
on asset holdings, current income, and credit market status. For a measure to





This implies ﬁxed interest rates on loans and deposits and a constant
fraction of bankrupt households. Not every stationary probability measure,
however, qualiﬁes as part of an equilibrium. Since the private bond market
mustclear, aggregateholdingsofprivatebondsmustbezero. Additionally, all
public debt must be held in equilibrium. Therefore, market clearing requires
that the aggregate supply of bonds equals the stock of public debt, D.
Next, as the banking sector is competitive, proﬁts also must be zero.
The zero-proﬁt constraint is motivated as follows: First, let Xneg ={ x ∈





for the intermediary will therefore be (1+rl)(|

Xneg a(x)dµ|). Analogously,
the total cost of funds for the intermediary is determined by total borrowing
times the gross deposit interest rate, |(1+rd)

Xneg a(x)dµ|. The losses from
default are on both interest and principal from those who borrow. Deﬁne
π(x) to be the probability that a household in state x will default. Total
principal losses are therefore |

X a(x)π(x)dµ|. The zero proﬁt condition on







Xneg a(x)dµ|=0. (Note that the aggregate default rate is then
given by   ≡

X π(x)dµ.) Lastly, the unemployment insurance system must
collect revenues equal to outlays, i.e., ηu = (1−ρ)µeθY. The following ﬁve
equations will therefore deﬁne equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 A stationary equilibrium of the model is a four-tuple, (a(x),
π(x),µ(Z),(rl,rd)), that satisﬁes four conditions.
1. The decision rule, a(x), is optimal, given rd and rl.
2. µ(Z) is stationary: µ(Z) =

X Q(x,Z)dµ for all Z ∈ χB.
3. Asset market clearing:

X a(x)dµ = D.
4. Zero proﬁts: (1 + rl)( ( |







5. Unemployment insurance fund breaks even: ηu = (1 − ρ)µeθY.52 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
I use simple discrete state approximations to the value functions, condi-
tionalonincomeandcreditmarketstatus,andthenuseMonteCarlointegration
with antithetic variates to compute all integrals. I then bisect on both rl and
rd until I simultaneously clear markets and satisfy the zero-proﬁt condition.
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